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CASENOTES
Discrimination Against Resident Aliens:
Diminishing Expectations of Equal
Protection
Vargas v. Strake 710 F.2d 190 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. granted,
Bernal v. Fainter, 52 U.S.L.W. 3440 (U.S. Dec. 5, 1983)
(No. 83-630)
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Texas' found that the United States citizenship requirement for
notaries public in article 5949(2) of the Texas Statutes2 violated
the plaintiffs' equal protection guarantee under the fourteenth
amendment of the Constitution.3 At the time the action was
brought, plaintiffs Margarita Vargas and Efrem Bernal were Mexi-
can citizens lawfully residing in Texas. They sought a judgment
declaring4 that article 5949(2) was unconstitutional because it dis-
criminated against aliens and thus violated the equal protection
clause. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,
held, reversed: Article 5949(2) of the Texas Statutes does not vio-
late the plaintiffs' equal protection guarantee because the citizen-
ship requirement for the notary public position serves a legitimate
political interest of the State of Texas.5 Vargas v. Strake, 710 F.2d
190 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. granted, Bernal v. Fainter, 52 U.S.L.W.
3440. (U.S. Dec. 5, 1983) (No. 83-630).
In 1978, Efrem Bernal, a resident alien living in Texas, applied
to become a notary public in that state. The Secretary of State
1. The district court's opinion is not reported.
2. TEX. STAT. ANN. art. 5949(2) (Vernon Supp. 1982); the article provides: "To be eligi-
ble for appointment as a Notary Public, a person shall be a resident citizen of the United
State and of this state, and at least eighteen (18) years of age."
3. "No state shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
4. Plaintiffs sought declaratory judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202 (1948).
5. The court additionaly held that the action was not moot because one of the plaintiffs
was still a Mexican citizen, and it also held that plaintiff Bernal was not required to exhaust
state administrative remedies.
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denied his application because he did not fulfill the citizenship re-
quirement of article 5949(2). The Secretary's decision was upheld
at a state administrative hearing. In 1979, Margarita M. Vargas
also. applied to become a notary public in Texas. Her application
was held in abeyance until she could become a United States citi-
zen. She finally obtained her citizenship after the present action
was initiated.
When their applications for the notary public positions were
made, both Vargas and Bernal were Mexican citizens permanently
residing in Texas. Vargas was employed as a secretary/receptionist
in a real estate firm, having completed much of her education in
the United States. Bernal was a paralegal assistant to a legal aid
firm in Texas. Prior to that, he was employed in another legal aid
program in Indiana. He had been a notary public from 1974 to
1978 in Indiana.
When the plaintiffs' applications to become notaries were de-
nied, they brought an action in federal district court seeking a de-
claratory judgment to invalidate the citizenship requirement in ar-
ticle 5949(2). Vargas and Bernal both claimed that, as Mexican
citizens lawfully residing in the United States, they were being de-
nied equal treatment of the laws solely by virtue of their status as
aliens. The district court agreed with the plaintiffs and declared
that the citizenship requirement of article 5949(2) was unconstitu-
tional because it violated the fourteenth amendment of the Consti-
tution.' The plaintiffs also sought and obtained injunctive relief to
compel the Texas Secretary of State to consider their notary public
applications in spite of their alienage (i.e. their status as aliens).
The Secretary of State appealed the district court's decision,
raising four issues: a) whether the action was moot as to Vargas; b)
whether Bernal was required to exhaust state administrative reme-
dies; c) whether the plaintiffs were entitled to an award of attor-
ney's fees and court costs; and d) whether the district court ap-
plied the correct standard in reviewing the constitutionality of the
statute in question.7 The court of appeals summarily dealt with the
first two issues holding that: the action was moot as to Vargas,8 but
that Bernal had a valid claim which he was entitled to bring di-
6. See supra note 3.
7. Vargas v. Strake, 710 F.2d 190, 192 (5th Cir. 1983).
8. The action was moot as to Vargas because she was already a citizen by the time of
the appeal.
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rectly in federal court.' Because the court of appeals reversed and
held for the defendants, it did not have to consider the issue relat-
ing to court costs and attorney's fees. Most of the Vargas opinion
deals with the question of what standard of review should be used
in the evaluation of a statute which undeniably discriminates
against aliens. 10
When a group of people complain that a state statute discrimi-
nates against them, it is usually because the effect of the statute is
to impose hardships upon them while not imposing such hardships
upon others. In such situations, the aggrieved class will allege that
it is not receiving the equal protection of the laws because the par-
ticular discriminatory classification serves no legitimate state ob-
jective. The courts traditionally have shied away from these cases,
leaving it up to the legislature and the voting constituency to re-
solve these problems. At most, the courts have merely inquired
whether the discriminatory classification in the statute bears some
rational relation to the purpose of the statute. The answer to this
inquiry is usually in the affirmative, and the allegedly discrimina-
tory statute is upheld.
There are, however, certain statutes which are subjected to a
more probing scrutiny because of the nature of the classifications
they make. For example, there are statutes which directly or indi-
rectly affect the rights of a class of people who comprise minority
groups, such as blacks, hispanics or American Indians. These stat-
utes receive a "strict" scrutiny by the courts. The rationale is that
minorities do not have sufficient voting power to vindicate their
rights at the voting booth. Therefore, they need special protection
by the courts to guard against statutes which would disenfranchise
them from their rights.
Courts carefully examine this type of discriminatory statute
under a strict scrutiny standard of review. Under this standard of
review, there must be a compelling state interest justifying the
purpose of the statute and the means by which the purpose is ac-
complished must be so narrowly drawn that there is no less restric-
tive alternative. If there appears another way to achieve the same
end without making a discriminatory classification, the statute will
not be upheld.'
9. See Public Utilities Comm'n v. United States, 355 U.S. 534, 539-40 (1958).
10. 710 F.2d 190, 192 (5th Cir. 1983).
11. For more information on this subject see generally, J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J.
YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 689-601 (1978), L. TRBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 991-
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Aliens, as a class, present special problems. For the last cen-
tury, the Supreme Court has encountered difficulty in determining
what standard to use when reviewing a state statute which alleg-
edly discriminates against aliens. Should the courts treat them as a
special class which deserves heightened protection because they
are ineligible to vote? On the other hand, legally resident aliens are
not citizens, thus, should not the states be allowed to make certain
preferential distinctions in favor of United States citizens? After
all, most legally resident aliens are entitled to become citizens after
they meet the federal naturalization requirements.
One of the first major decisions in this area was an 1886 deci-
sion, Yick Wo v. Hopkins.12 The Supreme Court found that dis-
crimination based on alienage was impermissible under the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 3 Aliens were
deemed "persons" for equal protection purposes. Therefore, any
statute which arbitrarily discriminated against persons on the basis
of their alienage could not stand.
Following Yick Wo (and until 1946), the Supreme Court ap-
plied a standard of review based on a public/private interest dis-
tinction. The Court catalogued statutes as affecting either the pub-
lic interest of the state or the private interests of the individual.
Statutes which discriminated against aliens in the private sector
were found unconstitutional on the grounds that the state had no
legitimate interest in classifying persons in this area. For example,
in Truax v. Raich" the Court invalidated an Arizona law which
forced all employers with a workforce of more than five people to
make sure that at least eighty percent of their employees were
United States citizens. The statute's effect was to substantially re-
duce the number of jobs available to aliens residing in Arizona and
to interfere with the policies of private employers. The Court held
that a state can not deny aliens the opportunity to work because
"the right to work for a living in the common occupations of the
community, is of the very essence of the personal freedom and op-
1136 (1978). See also, Barret, Judicial Supervision of Legislative Classifications - A More
Enlightened Role for Equal Protection?, 1976 B.Y.U.L.REv. 89; Gunther, The Supreme
Court 1971 Term - Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A
Model for Newer Equal Protection, 86 HAEv.L.REv. 1 (1972); Wilkinson, The Supreme
Court, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Three Faces of Constitutional Equality, 61
VA.L.REv. 945 (1975).
12. 118 U.S. 35 (1886).
13. See supra note 3.
14. 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
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portunity that it was the purpose of the fourteenth Amendment to
secure." 15 The Court in Truax also decided that the Arizona stat-
ute conflicted with federal law which permits aliens to reside and
earn a living in any state. Consequently, the Arizona law had to be
subordinated to federal policy.
On the other hand, the Supreme Court was less strict when
reviewing state laws which imposed restrictions based on alienage
where the statutes dealt with the regulation of state property or
resources or the public domain. Discrimination against aliens on
such grounds was justified because the state had a legitimate inter-
est in regulating property and resources for the welfare of its own
United States citizens.' 6
In 1948, the public/private distinction was debilitated with the
Takahashi v. Fish and Game Commission17 decision. The Supreme
Court held that the State of California could not lawfully deprive
an alien of his means of livelihood even if his occupation necessa-
rily involved the depletion of one of California's resources, i.e. its
fishing banks. The California Game Commission had refused to is-
sue the plaintiff, an alien, a commercial fishing license because of a
state statute which prohibited licensing individuals ineligible for
citizenship under federal law. The Court found that although the
state had an interest in maintaining its fishing banks for the bene-
fit of its citizens (a "public interest"), it still could not discriminate
against aliens so as to deny them the right to earn a living.
In 1971, in Graham v. Richardson", the public/private distinc-
tion was put to rest. The Supreme Court held that states could not
withhold welfare benefits to aliens who otherwise qualified for such
benefits. The Court noted that Congress had permitted aliens to
become permanent residents of the United States and that they
are therefore entitled as such residents "to the full and equal bene-
15. Id. at 41.
16. For example, in Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138 (1914) the Court found valid
a state statute which made it unlawful for aliens to kill wild animals for game. The state
could lawfully discriminate against aliens in the management of its resources (game) for the
welfare of its citizens. Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175 (1915) approved of a New York statute
which permitted only United States citizens to be employed on public works. The state had
the right to distribute its resources only to its citizens. Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197
(1923) involved the constitutionality of the so-called anti-alien land laws. Aliens were not
permitted to hold farm land under a Washington statute. The Court found this discrimina-
tion permissible because the distribution of land falls within the state's right to determine
its own public policy.
17. 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
18. 403 U.S. 356 (1971).
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fit of all state laws for the security of persons and property."' 9 The
Court declared that classifications based on alienage were inher-
ently suspect, meaning that where such classifications are made
there is an implicit presumption of a violation of the Constitution.
Therefore, any statute which discriminates on the basis of citizen-
ship would be subject to strict judicial scrutiny.20 The Court in
Graham sanctioned a strict scrutiny standard of review for statutes
which classified on the basis of alienage, because "[a]liens as a
class are a prime example of a 'discrete and insular' minority. 2 1
Consequently, aliens should be given extra protection by the courts
from statutes which would tend to prevent noncitizens from exer-
cising their constitutionally protected rights.
In 1973, the Supreme Court announced two decisions in which
statutes which classified on the basis of alienage were struck down
as being violative of the fourteenth amendment equal protection
clause. The majority opinion in Sugarman v. Dougall2 found a
New York statute which flatly prohibited the employment of aliens
in the state's competitive civil service class to be invalid. The
Court applied a strict scrutiny standard of review in "look[ing] at
the substantiality of the state's interest in enforcing the statute in
question, and the narrowness of the limits within which the dis-
crimination is confined."28 The Court noted that because the state
has the power and responsibility to define its own political commu-
nity, it therefore inherently has a legitimate interest in requiring
United States citizenship of those people who hold certain govern-
mental positions. Consequently, the state may condition employ-
ment on citizenship only of those "officers who participate directly
in the formulation, execution or review of broad public policy [be-
cause they] perform functions that go to the heart of representa-
tive government. ' 24 Nonetheless, the New York statute in
Sugarman was held to be so broad that it was overinclusive be-
19. Id. at 378.
20. As already noted, under the strict scrutiny standard of review, there must be a
compelling state interest justifying the statute, and the means by which the purpose is ac-
complished must be closely tailored. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
21. Graham, 403 U.S. at 372 (quoting United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S.
144, 152 n.5 (1938)). The relevant part of the footnote in Carolene Products states:
"prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends
seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to
protect minorities, . . . may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry."
22. 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
23. Id. at 642.
24. Id. at 647.
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cause citizenship was a prerequisite for employment as even the
most menial office worker or typist. The Court found that the arbi-
trarily broad sweep of the statute did not meet the purpose of the
statute: to ensure that important state decision - and policy-mak-
ers would be United States citizens. The court therefore, declared
the New York statute unconstitutional.
In In re Griffiths2 5 the plaintiff challenged a rule promulgated
by the Connecticut state supreme court which required that all ap-
plicants for the state bar examination be United States citizens.
The Court recognized that a state does have a legitimate interest
in ensuring that state bar applicants have the requisite qualifica-
tions, but found that there are other more appropriate means to
achieve this end. A flat ban on permitting aliens to take the exami-
nation, therefore, was impermissibly overinclusive. The Court also
indicated that the restriction deprived aliens of the right to engage
in a lawful profession which did not relate in any way to the state's
right to manage its own political processes.
26
In 1976, in Examining Board v. Flores de Otero, 27 the Su-
preme Court struck down a Puerto Rican law which prohibited res-
ident aliens from practicing civil engineering privately. The Court
found the alienage-based classification unsustainable because it
was discriminatory and therefore violated the alien's equal protec-
tion guarantee. A year later, in Nyquist v. Mauclet25 the Court ap-
plied a strict scrutiny standard of review to a New York statute
which prohibited certain resident aliens from receiving financial
aid from the state for their higher education. In the Court's view,
the state failed to reasonably justify the discrimination, therefore,
aliens were being denied equal protection of the laws for no appar-
ent motive. The Court held that the statute was unconstitutional.
In 1978, in Foley v. Connelie29 the Court refused to invalidate
a New York statute which limited elegibility for appointment to
the state police force to United States citizens. Plaintiff, a resident
alien, was denied appointment to the state police force. When his
application was refused on the grounds of alienage, the plaintiff
sought a judgment declaring that the New York statute was an un-
25. 413 U.S. 717 (1973).
26. As noted in Sugarman, 413 U.S. 634 (1973), the Court has consistently found that
the states have a valid interest in defining their own political processes and policies.
27. 426 U.S. 572 (1976).
28. 432 U.S. 1 (1977).
29. 435 U.S. 291 (1978).
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constitutional violation of his right to equal protection. The Su-
preme Court did not apply a strict scrutiny standard of review.3 1 It
looked first to the type of profession the state was regulating,
namely, state troopers. The Court determined that the police had a
wide range of discretionary power and responsibility in the execu-
tion of state policy,3 ' therefore, the state had the prerogative to
impose discriminatory restrictions on prospective applicants to the
police force. The Court required only that the state demonstrate
some rational basis for the citizenship requirement.2 The state
complied by indicating that United States citizenship was ration-
ally related to the function of the police in the community because
citizen-police officers are presumed to be familiar with the consti-
tutional framework in which they are required to operate.
33
In Ambach v. Norwick, 4 the Court used a similar analysis to
that employed in Foley. The statute in question in Ambach barred
elementary and secondary school teachers from taking positions
with the New York State educational system if they were not
United States citizens and had not manifested an intention to be-
come citizens. The plaintiffs, who were resident aliens, sought to
have the statute declared unconstitutional because it violated their
right to equal protection of the law by impairing their ability to
seek lawful employment. The Court first inquired into the nature
of the profession being regulated by the state and found that pub-
lic school teachers play a necessary role in the development of
democratic and civic values in children. Consequently, educators
have to be well acquainted with American politics and democratic
institutions to be able to achieve such a goal. The Court agreed
with New York's argument that the best way to achieve this educa-
tional goal is to require United States citizenship of public school
teachers.
In Cabell v. Chavez-Salido,3 5 a 1982 decision, the Court an-
nounced a formal standard of review of state statutes which dis-
criminate against aliens. The plaintiffs in Cabell sought a judg-
30. The Court summarized its reasoning by stating that: "[ihe essence of our holdings
to date is that although we extend to aliens the right to education and public welfare, along
with the ability to earn a livelihood and engage in licensed professions, the right to govern is
reserved to citizens." Id. at 297.
31. See Sugarman, 413 U.S. at 647.
32. Foley, 435 U.S. at 296.
33. Id. at 297-300.
34. 441 U.S. 68 (1979).
35. 454 U.S. 432 (1982).
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ment declaring a California statute which required United States
citizenship of probation officers unconstitutional because it dis-
criminated against aliens and was therefore in violation of the
equal protection clause. The Court, relying in part on Sugarman v.
Dougall, determined that the statute was constitutional because
"although citizenship is not a relevant ground for the distribution
of economic benefits, it is a relevant ground for determining mem-
bership in the political community. 3 7 In effect, the Court articu-
lated a new standard of review: if the statute in question imposes a
restriction upon aliens to the detriment of their lawful economic
interests, then the statute would be subject to strict judicial scru-
tiny."8 If, however, the statute falls within the state's power to de-
fine its own political community, the Court will keep judicial in-
quiry to a minimum. 9
In Cabell, the Court formulated a two-step process to deter-
mine on which side of the economic/political equal protection con-
tinuum a discriminatory citizenship requirement is situated:
First, the specificity of the classification will be examined: a
classification that is substantially overinclusive or underinclu-
sive tends to undercut the governmental claim that the classifi-
cation serves legitimate political ends .... Second, even if the
classification is sufficiently tailored, it may be applied in theparticular case only to 'persons holding state elective or impor-
tant nonelective executive, legislative, and judicial positions,'
those officers who 'participate directly in the formulation, execu-
tion or review of broad public policy."'0
Under California law, probation officers fall under the general cate-
gory of peace officers. All peace officers are required by statute to
be United States citizens. Even though this mandate is very broad
because it encompasses a large class of state governmental posi-
tions, the Court found the classification sufficiently tailored to the
purpose of the statute. The Court noted that peace officers, in
36. The Court in Sugarman had applied a strict scrutiny standard of review, but lim-
ited its holding considerably. See Sugarman, 413 U.S. at 646-9.
37. Cabel, 454 U.S. at 438.
38. See supra notes 18-28 and accompanying text.
39. Cabell, 454 U.S. at 438-41.
40. Id. at 440 (quoting Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 647 (1973)). The Court went
on to inquire, with reference to the second step: "whether the 'position in question ...
involves discretionary decisionmaking, or execution of policy, which substantially affects
members of the political community.'" Id. at 440-1 (quoting Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S.
291, 296 (1978)).
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their capacity as probation officers, have a broad discretionary role
in the execution of state policy. Therefore, California can require
citizenship of its probation officers because their duties are within
the political interests of the state.
Vargas v. Strake" presents the issue of the constitutionality
of requiring United States citizenship of persons wishing to be-
come notaries public in Texas. The district court found the restric-
tion unconstitutional under both the strict scrutiny and rational
relationship standards of review. It rendered its opinion, however,
prior to the Cabell decision. The court of appeals in Vargas noted
this point and proceeded to apply the Cabell test to determine
whether the discrimination falls on the economic or political side
of the equal protection continuum. "[O]ur inquiry . . . should be
whether the citizenship requirement imposed by Texas on the po-
sition of notary public serves political or economic goals, applying
the two-step process . . ." formulated in Cabell.
2
The court of appeals looked first to the specificity of the statu-
tory requirement of citizenship. 43 Because the particular statute
deals only with notaries public, the citizenship restriction extends
only to notaries. The court found this level of discrimination to be
sufficiently narrow to meet the first step of the Cabell process. The
court next inquired into the role of the notary public within the
political processes of the state by considering whether: "a notary
public in Texas exercise[s] discretion in making decisions which
substantially affect members of the political community?""'
To answer this question, the court reviewed the duties of the
notary as provided by the Texas statutes. It noted that, in Texas, a
notary has the power to acknowledge written instruments such as
wills, leases, deeds and mortgages. Notaries may take depositions
out of court, they may administer oaths and, at their discretion,
may refuse to perform these acts if there is some uncertainty as to
the identification of the persons with whom they are dealing.45
Documents certified by a notary, such as wills, are, in certain cases,
admissible as evidence without further proof.'6 The court in Var-
gas found that notaries public in Texas perform a variety of discre-
41. 710F.2d 190 (5th Cir. 1983).
42. Id. at 194.
43. See supra note 2.
44. 710 F.2d at 195.
45. TEx. STAT. ANN. art. 5954 (Vernon Supp. 1982).
46. T)x. PROB. CODE ANN. art. 59 (Vernon 1971).
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tionary activities which affect the functioning of the state govern-
ment. The court concluded that the discriminatory restriction
passed the Cabell test because: a) an examination of the Texas
statute reveals that the discrimination against aliens is narrowly
confined, and b) the role of the notary public in the political com-
munity of the state is substantial enough to warrant the statutorily
imposed citizenship requirement.
These conclusions place the notary public position within the
political interests of the state. The court in Vargas upheld the con-
stitutionality of the statute by applying a rational relationship test.
It stated that "[t]he citizenship restriction in art. 5949(2) bears a
rational relationship to the state's interest in the proper and or-
derly handling of a countless variety of legal documents of impor-
tance to the state."' 7
The dissenting judge took issue with the majority opinion's
characterization of the role the notary plays in the functioning of
the state government. The dissent pointed out that a lawyer per-
forms duties similar to those of a notary, and yet the states cannot
require lawyers to be citizens but can impose the restriction with
respect to notaries.4 8 The dissent also found that because notaries
perform nothing more than ministerial functions, it is by a stretch
of the imagination to hold that they perform discretionary deci-
sionmaking or execute broad public policy. Because a notary's du-
ties do not affect the political goals of the state, the dissent con-
cluded that there is no justifiable reason to require a notarial
applicant to be a citizen.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court, in Cabell v. Chavez-Salido,'4 has set out
a standard of review somewhere between strict scrutiny and ra-
tional relationship tests. The initial and ultimately decisive deter-
mination is whether a discriminatory statute affects either the eco-
nomic interest of the individual or the political interests of the
state. The Vargas case is an excellent example of the Cabell pro-
cess at work. The court of appeals noted that there is no personal
economic advantage to being a notary public." This observation
47. 710 F.2d at 194.
48. See In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973).
49. 454 U.S. 432 (1982).
50. 710 F.2d at 191.
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appeared to automatically place the notary public position within
the political interests of the state. After a perfunctory analysis of
the statute and of the notary's duties, the court held that a state
may discriminate against aliens who wish to become notaries
public.
Vargas pinpoints one of the problems with the Cabell test. It
is true that a notarial position is not a viable way of earning a
living, consequently, the discrimination against aliens does not af-
fect their economic interests. Nevertheless, as noted in the Vargas
dissent, it cannot be said that notaries perform any essential gov-
ernmental tasks that further the political interests of the state.
This is true especially in light of In re Griffiths, which held that a
state cannot prohibit legal resident aliens from taking the bar ex-
amination. If an alien can become a lawyer, there is no reason why
he or she should not be allowed to become a notary public as well.
Many of the notarial tasks can be performed by lawyers. Conced-
edly, there is a greater economic interest in becoming an attorney
than in becoming a notary. The focus of the Cabell test, however,
is on the political aspect, if any, of the classification which "may be
applied . . . only to . . . those officers who 'participate directly in
the formulation, execution or review of broad public policy."'
Where does this leave a resident alien, such as the plaintiff in Var-
gas, who can not show that a discriminatory statute will adversely
affect his economic welfare? The Cabell test leaves no room for
additional considerations.
Another problem with the Cabell test is that the economic/
political distinction will seldom be a clear one. In Vargas, the dis-
criminatory classification did not affect the economic interests of
resident aliens, thus, the difficulty of making the determination
did not really arise. The Vargas court nonetheless alluded to the
problem by specifically mentioning the fact that the plaintiffs
would not be economically disadvantaged by the restriction."
The application of the Cabell test, as demonstrated in Vargas,
places resident aliens in an insecure position. As shown, there are
various difficulties with this new standard of review. New problems
will undoubtedly arise as more courts begin to apply the test, and
other problems will be solved. Yet, one can not help but question
the viability of this test when the federal immigration laws are
considered. Federal law permits lawful resident aliens to reside and
51. Id.
[Vol. 15:3
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seek employment wherever they wish. Has the Supreme Court pre-
empted the federal government in this area of the law? If the
states can now refuse aliens "political" positions (i.e., notaries pub-
lic), will aliens be forced to acquire citizenship to protect their
rights?
FRANCISCA COPELAND-LOPEZ
